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Notes
THE ADMINISTRATION OF ECONOMIC
CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 1970
The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 conferred upon the Executive discretion-
arypower to issue orders and regulations to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and sala-
ries. Pursuant to this authority, President Nixon instituted a broad system of
mandatory economic controls in theperiod 1971-74. This Note critiques the admin-
istration and enforcement of these controls. The author details the hearing and
rulemaking procedures, the organization and staffing of stabilization agencies, the
exemption and exceptions processes, and the enforcement and disclosure mecha-
nisms. In light of the possible reimposition of mandatory controls, the author pro-
poses certain procedural and structural changes to effect a more equitable and
efficient system for administering these controls.
INTRODUCTION
THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 1970,1 effectivefrom August 15, 1970 to April 30, 1974, conferred upon the
President virtually unrestricted authority to institute and adminis-
ter a system of economic controls. Under this authority, President
Nixon imposed broad mandatory controls over prices, rents,
wages, and salaries.2 Despite the Carter administration's pro-
1. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, enacted August 15, 1970, authorized the Presi-
dent to issue orders and regulations to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries. The au-
thority to issue such orders and regulations was to expire at midnight, February 28, 1971.
The Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-558, § 201, 84 Stat. 1468, extended the authority
through March 31, 1971. The Act of March 31, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-8, §2, 85 Stat. 13,
extended the authority through May 31, 1971. The Act of May 18, 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-15, § 3, 85 Stat. 38, extended the authority through April 30, 1972, and limited the
President's authority to exercise controls selectively with respect to a particular industry or
segment of the economy unless prices or wages had increased at a highly disproportionate
rate in relation to the general economy. The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743, extended the authority through April 30, 1973,
provided some legislative guidance for the administration of the stabilization program, and
brought dividends and interest within the scope of the Act. The Economic Stabilization
Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, §§ 2-8, 87 Stat. 27, extended the authority
through April 30, 1974, and provided clearer guidance in policy and procedure.
2. The stabilization program was administered in four phases. Phase I, put into ef-
fect by Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971), imposed a 90-day general freeze
on prices, rents, wages, and salaries effective from August 15, 1971 to November 13, 1971,
and established the Cost of Living Council. This Council was charged with primary re-
sponsibility for administering the stabilization program and recommending policies and
mechanisms to permit an orderly transition from the general freeze to a more flexible and
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nouncements of an absolute reluctance to invoke mandatory
wage-price controls,3 the imposition of some system of control re-
mains a realistic possibility.4 The purpose of this Note, then, is to
selective system of control. Phase II, implemented by Exec. Order No. 11627, 36 Fed. Reg.
20139 (1971), was a more flexible system of controls effective from November 13, 1971 to
January 11, 1973. The order perpetuated the Cost of Living Council and delineated further
its powers and responsibilities. A seven-member Price Commission, composed of public
representatives appointed by the Executive, was established to formulate and to administer
price and rent controls. Wage and salary controls were to be administered by the Pay
Board, composed of 15 business, labor, and public representatives appointed by the Presi-
dent. The order further established Committees on Interest and Dividends, on the Health
Service Industry, and on State and Local Government Cooperation. Phase III, promul-
gated in Exec. Order No. 11695, 38 Fed. Reg. 1473 (1973), consisted of a set of vague, self-
administered standards which became effective on January 11, 1973. The order created a
full-time position of Director of the Cost of Living Council, reaffirmed the broad discretion
of the Council, authorized the continued existence of the Construction Industry Stabiliza-
tion Committee, and established the Cost of Living Council Committees on Health and
Food, and the Labor-Management Advisory Committee. The previously established Pay
Board and Price Commission were merged into the Cost of Living Council. On June 13,
1971, a 60-day general price freeze was imposed by Exec. Order No. 11723, 38 Fed. Reg.
15763 (1973). This order followed the amendments to the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, extending until April 30, 1974, the legislative authority to implement the program.
The President stressed the successful impact which labor and management efforts had pro-
vided the program but imposed the freeze on prices for commodities and services, exclud-
ing raw agricultural services, because the effect of the program on pricing behavior had
proved insufficient. The freeze period was intended to be used for the creation of new
controls, operative after its expiration. Phase IV, put into effect by Exec. Order No. 11730,
38 Fed. Reg. 19345 (1973), was a system of gradual decontrol carried out on a sector-by-
sector basis governing the period from August 13, 1973 to April 30, 1974, when the author-
ity for wage and price controls expired. Phase IV modified the control program within the
food industry; it removed the freeze on all products except beef and instituted a two-stage
process for control, the first stage commencing on July 18, 1973. The freeze in other sectors
of the economy was continued through August 12, 1973. In addition, the Cost of Living
Council was directed to publish for comment its Phase IV proposals for alternative controls
in these latter sectors. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE TREASURY, His-
TORICAL WORKING PAPERS ON THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM, AUGUST 15,
1971 TO APRIL 30, 1974, at 9-91 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HISTORICAL WORKING PA-
PERS]; W. TONGUE, How WE CAN HALT INFLATION AND STILL KEEP OUR JOBS 173-204
(1974); Jones, The Lessons of Wage and Price Controls, in WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS:
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 1-3 (J. Kraft & B. Roberts eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WAGE
AND PRICE CONTROLS]; Note, Sector by SectorAnti-Inflation Legislation: ProposedAmend-
ments to the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 363, 367-78
(1976).
3. President Carter has stated, "I am not going to impose mandatory wage and price
controls in this country." N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, §A, at 1, col. 5. However, the Nixon
administration also was in principle opposed to wage and price controls, and had made
promises similar to those of the Carter administration prior to the imposition of controls in
1971. Friedman, History Repeats, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1978, at 94.
4. See Silk, The Troubled Guidelines, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1979, § D, at 2, col. 1;
Walker, The Voluntary Guidelines Will Be Mandatory, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1978, § F, at
16, col. 3; Will, Down the Path ofEconomic Controls, Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1978, § C,
at 7, col. 1; Wicker, Carter Now Has the Clout to Test Controls, Washington Star, Oct. 15,
1978, § D, at 3, col. 2; Greer & Kandel, White House Starts Leaning Toward Pay, Price
Controls, id., Sept. 25, 1978, § B, at 6, col. I; Rowen, Is It Time/or Wage-Price Controls?,
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examine the Nixon-era stabilization program to determine
whether it was administered fairly and effectively, and to offer
structural and procedural suggestions for a more equitable and
efficient system of mandatory controls.
I. DELEGATION OF POWER
The Stabilization Act represented a virtually unprecedented
peacetime congressional delegation of power to the executive
branch.- Within the executive branch, this authority to make de-
cisions affecting all facets of the national economy was in turn
Washington Post, Aug. 3, 1978, § A, at 23, col. I. But see Kraft, No Mandatory Controls,
id., Nov. 28, 1978, § A, at 15, col. 1. The area of energy is already under extensive govern-
ment control. Eg., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350
(establishing ceiling prices on natural gas and authorizing executive power to implement
price controls in a national emergency); Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (establishing federal standards governing ratemaking for
electric utilities). President Carter has also proposed controls on the health industry. Presi-
dent's Message to Congress Proposing Enactment of the Hospital Cost Containment Act of
1977 and the Child Health Assessment Act of 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
603-05 (May 2, 1977). This proposal has been cited as an example of creeping wage and
price controls applied to individual sectors rather than pursuant to a comprehensive plan.
Proposed Amendments to the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act: Hearings on H.A
3184, HR. 2100, H.RA 3810, and HR 2094 Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 267-68
(1977) (statement of Jack Carlson, Vice President and Chief Economist, United States
Chamber of Commerce).
Recent Harris polls have shown significant public support for economic controls. Har-
ris, Anti-Inflation Plan Will Take Time, Public Agrees, Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1978, §A,
at 8, col. 1.
5. Economic Stabilization. Oversight Hearings on the Operation of the Economic Sta-
bilization Act of 1970 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 63 (1971) (statement of David Ginsburg, former General Counsel, Office of Price
Administration) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House Oversight Hearings] ("No legislative body
of any democratic country ... comparable to our own, has ever given its Chief Executive
the freedom to act on dollars-and-cents economic life and death matters that this Congress
gave the President on August 15, 1970."). See Controls or Competition: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 244 (1972) (statement of Sen. Harris) ("Many prominent observers at the time argued
that the imposition of such sweeping controls in peacetime could, over the long run, radi-
cally alter the nature of our political and economic system .... Nonetheless, the Con-
gress acted as though it was considering some routine piece of legislation.").
The Act was also criticized as giving virtually dictatorial powers to the President. The
1971 Economic Report of the President: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1971) (statement of Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Economic Report Hearings]; Se-
lective Credit Policies and Wage-Price Stabilizationt Hearings on S. 1201 and HRA 4246
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971) (statement of Arthur F. Burns). See 116
Cong. Rec. 26, 797 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Gross) (noting the failure of the bill to require
the President to declare either a war or a domestic emergency prior to invoking the power
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delegated to semi-autonomous agencies, such as the Cost of Liv-
ing Council, which were created to administer the stabilization
program.6  These agencies, largely exempt from the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA),7 were subject to ambiguous statutory
standards that permitted administration and enforcement in an
unchecked manner and that afforded only a limited right of ap-
peal."
In delegating to the Executive the standby authority to insti-
tute economic controls with few restrictions on their application,
Congress manifested the belief that imposition of these controls at
the discretion of the President was the superior means of imple-
to exercise controls). The Act was also referred to as an economic Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion. 1971 Economic Report Hearings, supra at 431 (statement of Prof. Arthur S. Miller).
6. During Phase II, in accordance with general policies formulated by the Cost of
Living Council, the Pay Board prescribed regulations and standards and promulgated rul-
ings and decisions governing wage increases. The Price Commission engaged in similar
actions in regard to price increases. Later, these two agencies were merged into the Cost of
Living Council, which assumed their functions. See note 2 supra.
Throughout this Note, where the matter discussed is one of general applicability to the
various agencies which administered the stabilization program, the terms "stabilization
agency" or "agency" are used.
7. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). See notes 25-34 infra and accompanying
text.
8. Congressional Oversight ofAdministrative Agencies (Cost ofLiving Council): Hear-
ings Be/ore the Subcomm on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (statement of Sen. Mathias) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Judici-
ary Hearings]. The only limitation contained in the original Act was that prices, rents,
wages, and salaries could not be stabilized at levels lower than those prevailing on May 25,
1970. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202, 84 Stat. 799 (expired
1971).
The centralization of power in the designated semi-autonomous agencies was subject to
sharp criticism. Economic Stabilization Hearings to Extend andAmend the Economic Stabi-
lization Act of1970 Be/ore the House Comm on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
506 (1971) (statement of Ralph Nader) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Extension Hearings]; 1972
Economic Report of the President: Hearings Be/ore the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 873 (1972) (statement of Profs. Howard Sherman & E.K. Hunt); Controls or Com-
petition: Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoiy ofthe Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (statement of Frank Bond, Chairman of the Board,
Holiday Universal) (characterizing controls as having the inherent power to lead the
United States into a centrally-controlled, fascist state); Economic Stabilization Legislation:
Hearings on S. 2712 Be/ore the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 122, 125 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings] (statement of
David Ginsburg) ("[There is] a major question of legality here, where legislative power is
proposed to be delegated to a private group. This brings to mind visions of corporate
statism and a syndicalist philosophy."); The President's New Economic Program: Hearings
Beore the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 429-30 (1971) (statement of Prof.
Arthur S. Miller) [hereinafter cited as New Economic Program Hearings] ("If, indeed, post-
freeze economic policy is worked out in conjunction with business and labor leaders, the
obvious result is the American version of the corporate state.").
19791
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mentation.9 Congress apparently determined that the Executive
was best equipped to decide the appropriate time to institute and
remove controls and to devise the rules and regulations necessary
to implement a stabilization program.'" Supporters of this view
cited the possibility that controls might have to be removed totally
or partially prior to the legislatively prescribed termination date,
and the prospective inability of Congress to act speedily toward
this end." Moreover, administration and enforcement of
mandatory economic controls without the active and full coopera-
tion -of the Executive would have posed practical difficulties.' 2
Although Congress imposed only minimal limitations upon
the Executive in the Economic Stabilization Act, this delegation of
power survived constitutional challenges in the courts. In Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Connally,'3 a three-judge district
court denied injunctive relief against enforcement of an Executive
order freezing wages and prices issued pursuant to the Act. The
9. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REPORT ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
EXTENSION AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1970). Senator Proxmire suggested that Congress' delegation of power to the Executive
was a political ploy, CONG. Q. 3217 (Dec. 8, 1973), since Congress gave the authority to
institute economic controls to a President who was opposed to such power being vested in
the Executive and had pledged never to use it. See HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 2, at 11. Two months before enactment of the Stabilization Act, the President stated,
"I will not take this Nation down the road of wage and price controls, however politically
expedient that may seem. .. . The Congress knows I will not impose controls because
they would do more harm than good." President's Message to Congress on Economic Pol-
icy and Productivity, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 778 (June 22, 1970). At the signing
of the Defense Production Act Extension which contained the Stabilization Act, President
Nixon stated, "I have previously indicated that I did not intend to exercise such authority if
it were given to me." 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DoC. 1078 (Aug. 24, 1970). President
Nixon later stated, "I do not intend to impose wage and price controls which would substi-
tute new, growing and more vexatious problems for the problems of inflation. Neither do I
intend to rely upon an elaborate facade that seems to be wage and price controls but is
not. . . . This is a policy of action, but not a policy of action for action's sake." ECo-
NOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 7 (Feb. 1971).
10. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REPORT ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
EXTENSION AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1970).
11. Id. Congress might not have been in session when immediate action was needed
to revise or terminate economic controls, or its cumbersome legislative procedures might
have hindered the achievement of a sufficiently rapid response to national economic needs.
Id.
12. The work of the Price Commission was hampered seriously by the lack of support
given to it by the Nixon administration. Askin, Wage-Price Controls in Administrative and
Political Perspective: The Case of the Price Commission During Phase II, in WAGE AND
PRICE CONTROLS, supra note 2, at 29-31.
13. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971); accord, DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d
1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). See note 58 infra.
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court found that the legislative description of the task assigned to
the Executive "sufficiently marks the field within which the Ad-
ministrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept
within it in compliance with the legislative will."' 4 Thus, the dele-
gation of legislative power did not contravene article I of the Con-
stitution which vested all legislative powers in Congress.1
5
However, the courts never ruled upon the validity of the delega-
tion of authority to administrative bodies, such as the Pay Board
and the Price Commission. It had been argued that this was an
unconstitutional delegation of power to private groups since these
agencies were not comprised of full-time government officials.'
6
In enacting stabilization legislation, Congress rejected efforts
to limit Executive authority. In 1970, an amendment that would
have imposed a wage-price freeze directly, instead of granting
standby control authority to the President, was defeated by the
House of Representatives. 7 Other amendments requiring some
positive approval of Executive orders by Congress were rejected
by both Houses.' 8 After controls were instituted, however, Con-
14. 337 F. Supp. at 746 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944)).
The court further stated that the Act was not unconstitutional under the "intelligible princi-
ple" rule of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States: "There is no forbidden delegation
of legislative power if Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the official or agency must conform." 337 F. Supp. at 746 (quoting J.W. Hampton,
Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
In holding that the power granted to the President was sufficiently limited, the court
identified the following factors: (1) that the authority to stabilize prices and wages was
limited to levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970; (2) that, pursuant to a 1971
amendment, the President was precluded from singling out particular industries or eco-
nomic sectors upon which to impose controls unless there was a finding of a disproportion-
ate increase in wages or prices; (3) that the controls instituted by the Executive were
constrained by a standard of fairness and equity and were subject to judicial review; and
(4) that, although not dispositive of the constitutional issue, the stabilization authority dele-
gated to the President was limited in time. 337 F. Supp. at 747-48, 754-58.
Some contended that the Act did not contain an intelligible principle. See New Eco-
nomic Program Hearings supra note 8, at 431 (statement of Prof. Arthur S. Miller). For an
analysis of the "intelligible principle" rule, see Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 564 (1947).
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representa-
tives."
16. See 1971 Extension Hearings, supra note 8, at 505 (statement of Ralph Nader)
("[I]f the Pay Board and the Price Commission are Federal agencies then why isn't Con-
gress creating them explicitly? If they are not Federal agencies, what are they-advisory
committees with a full-time Government chairman? What legal no man's land is being
developed here?").
17. 116 CONG. Rc. 26,830 (1970) (amendment offered by Rep. Blackburn).
18. 117 CONG. REC. 13,235 (1971) (amendment conditioning Executive authority to
impose general controls on a concurrent resolution of Congress defeated in the Senate); 116
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gress did adopt some legislation limiting Executive discretion in
administering such controls.19 Furthermore, numerous bills
designed to reverse administratively determined policies or other-
wise curtail Executive discretion were introduced by individual
members of Congress.2°
In 1974, in considering a proposal to extend the Executive's
control authority, the Senate adopted an amendment providing
for a one-house congressional veto of any imposition of controls
by the Executive.2' Another proposal advanced to facilitate
prompt congressional vetoes in a stabilization program adminis-
tered by the Executive provided that control authority would ex-
pire a short time after any controls were instituted, thus affording
Congress an opportunity to halt any stabilization program by re-
fusing to extend the control authority.22 The latter proposal
avoids the constitutional uncertainties raised by congressional ve-
toes,23 but presents a serious drawback since control authority
CONG. REC. 26,838 (1970) (amendment requiring approval by a joint congressional com-
mittee defeated in the House of Representatives).
19. In a reversal of administration policy, Congress enacted a provision requiring ret-
roactive payment of wage increases in certain instances. Economic Stabilization Act
Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 203(c), 85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973). Congress
exempted any individual from wage controls whose earnings were substandard or who was
a member of the working poor. Id. Not satisfied with administrative implementation of
this provision, Congress later defined "substandard earnings" as a wage or salary rate
yielding $3.50 per hour or less. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-28, § 3, 87 Stat. 27 (expired 1974). Congress excluded employer contributions to
certain pension, profit-sharing, annuity, and savings plans, and any group insurance or
disability and health plan from the scope of wage control authority. Id. § 5.
20. For a catalog of bills, see Index of Legislative Activity, May 1, 1973 to April 30,
1974, reprinted in HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 221-40.
21. 120 CONG. REC. 12,628-29 (1974) (amendment of Sens. Humphrey & Roth). In
considering whether to veto proposed orders or regulations, Congress was to consider,
among other factors, whether a proposed order or regulation would seriously impair pro-
duction in a manner which would create shortages or economic distortions, stimulate for-
eign demand and encourage excessive exports of scarce commodities, or fail to moderate
effectively the rate of inflation. Id. This amendment was never enacted because the provi-
sion that it amended was tabled. 120 CONG. REC. 12,641 (1974). Senator Proxmire had
earlier expressed opposition to a congressional veto of stabilization regulations, fearing that
Congress would be so swamped with complex and detailed regulations that it would be
unable to evaluate them properly. New Economic Program Hearings, supra note 8, at 437
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). This argument has been made in opposition to congressional
veto authority in general. See H.R. REP. No. 1014, pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-5 8 (1976)
(dissenting views of Rep. Seiberling).
22. Selective Credit Policies and Wage-Price Stabilization: Hearings on S. 1201 and
H.A 4246 Before the SubcomnL on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 33 (1971) (statement of Arthur F.
Burns). Chairman Bums proposed having stabilization authority expire 30 to 60 days after
the institution of controls. Id.
23. The constitutionality of a congressional veto is uncertain because it allows a single
[Vol. 29:458
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could expire because of Congress' inability to enact legislation
quickly. This problem, however, could be alleviated by according
a bill extending stabilization authority privileged status, requiring
consideration on the floor either immediately or shortly after in-
troduction.24 Such a scheme would allow Congress a role in the
institution of any program of controls while avoiding the practical
drawbacks and the constitutional problems inherent in any con-
gressional veto over the institution of controls or over individual
regulations implementing a stabilization program.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
The agencies created by the President to administer the stabili-
zation program were exempted from most of the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act25 by the Economic Stabilization
Act Amendments of 1971.26 Executive agencies were not exempt,
however, from provisions governing the information, rules, opin-
ions, and orders that must be published in the Federal Register;
the material that must be available for public inspection;27 the
procedures for agency rulemaking;28 and the notice requirements
in connection with agency proceedings.29 Other sections of the
APA dealing with adjudications, 30 hearings, 3' decisions on adjudi-
cations, 32 imposition of sanctions,33 and judicial review34 were
among those made inapplicable to the stabilization agencies.
house to take legally effective action without the concurrence of the other house and with-
out the opportunity for a Presidential veto. See generally CongressionalReview ofAdminis-
trative Rulemaking: Hearings on HA 3658, HA 8231, and Related Bills Before the
Subcomr. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Commr on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 378 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice); Comment, Congress Steps Out:
4 Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983, 1053 (1975).
24. This is similar to the procedure provided in the Reorganization Act of 1977 that
guarantees that every reorganization plan will be put to a vote in both Houses of Congress.
5 U.S.C. §§ 911-912 (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
26. Pub. L. No. 91-210, § 207, 85 Stat. 746 (expired 1973). Section 207 provides in
part that: "The functions exercised under this title are excluded from the operation of
subchapter II of chapter 5, and chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, except as to the
requirements of §§ 552, 553, and 555(e) of title 5, United States Code." Id. § 207(a).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
28. Id. § 553.
29. Id. § 555(e).
30. Id. § 554.
31. Id. § 556.
32. Id. § 557.
33. Id. § 558.
34. Id. §§ 701-706.
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In support of this exemption, it was argued that the APA was
not intended to apply to agencies administering economic con-
trols. It was argued that when strictly followed, the requirements
of the APA can become cumbersome, time consuming, and expen-
sive, thus conflicting with the goals of speed and limited bureau-
cracy essential to a program of economic stabilization.35 It was
further pointed out that past legislation establishing forms of eco-
nomic control, such as the Export Control Act of 1949,36 the De-
fense Production Act of 1950, 37 and the Export Administration
Act of 1969,38 exempted implementing agencies from all provi-
sions of the APA except that section pertaining to public informa-
tion.39 Individuals and groups representing disparate ideological
interests opposed the exemption of stabilization agencies from the
APA, contending that the APA was an intricate set of procedures
necessary to protect the rights of individuals and businesses in ad-
ministrative dealings with the federal government.4 °
Because of their exemption from the APA, stabilization agen-
cies were directed by statute to develop their own procedures to
govern requests for the interpretation, modification, and rescission
of, and exception or exemption from, agency rules, regulations,
and orders.4 1 These were to include an appeals process within the
agency. Agencies were not required to conduct hearings at any
stage;42 however, agencies were directed by law to conduct formal
35. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 92 (letter from L. Patrick Gray III, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice to Sen. Sparkman (Nov. 8,
1971)).
36. Ch. 11, § 7, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (expired 1969).
37. Ch. 932, § 709, 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (expired 1979). Under the authority granted by
this Act, wage and price controls were instituted during the Korean War. For a description
of the agency procedures during the Korean War stabilization period, see Reports on Con-
trolAgencies by the Committee on Emergency ControlAgencies, Administrative Law Section,
Bar Association ofthe District ofColumbia, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 559 (1952).
38. Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 8, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (expired 1971).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) (original version at ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)).
40. See, e.g., 1971 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 5, at 149 (statement of Patrick
E. Gorman, representing the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union); 1971 Extension Hearings,
supra note 8, at 500 (statement of Milton A. Smith, representing the United States Cham-
ber of Commerce); id. at 491-92 (statement of Milton M. Carrow, representing the Ameri-
can Bar Association); id. at 504 (statement of Ralph Nader); id at 448 (statement of Rep.
Ryan).
41. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 207(b),
85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973).
42. Id. Hearings were not required because of the feeling that, although they would
encourage public participation in the stabilization program, they would increase the chance
of leakage in advance of wage or price decisions. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 8,
at 92 (statement of L. Patrick Gray III).
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hearings, to the maximum extent possible, on any change or pro-
posed change in wages, prices, or other areas which could have a
significantly large impact upon the nation's economy.43 Neverthe-
less, these agency procedures failed to provide adequate guaran-
tees of basic procedural due process because the internal appellate
process often required appeal to the person who had made the
initial decision on the matter,' the exceptions process was ineffi-
cient and often inequitable,45 and few public hearings were ever
held.46
A. Hearings
The first hearing on specific proposed price increases was not
held until September 1972,47 after $10 billion in price increases
had been granted without hearings.4" It was held only after a suit
to compel hearings had been filed49 and was criticized as being
designed merely to create the appearance of public participation
rather than allowing substantive public comment.50 In response
to similar complaints and the general lack of hearings, a proposal
was advanced requiring hearings when they would serve to inform
the public or to aid in obtaining information on actions taken or
proposed.5' Under the proposal, hearings would have been re-
43. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 207(c), 85
Stat. 743 (expired 1973).
44. See HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 644.
45. See notes 130-67 infra and accompanying text.
46. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 53 (statement of Peter J. Petkas,
Attorney, Corporate Accountability Research Group).
47. The hearing on proposed automobile price increases was held September 12 and
13, 1972. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 53-54 (statement of Peter J.
Petkas). There had been 11 prior Price Commission hearings, but they had not focused on
specific price increases. See Price and Wage Control- An Evaluation of Current Policies:
Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1972) (statement of
C. Jackson Grayson, Chairman, Price Commission) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Price and
Wage Control Hearings].
48. Executive Compensation Rules: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 209 (1974)
(statement of Ralph Nader) [hereinafter cited as Executive Compensation Hearings].
49. Nader v. Grayson, No. 72-1492 (D.D.C., dismissed Aug. 22, 1972). See also C.
GRAYSON & L. NEEB, CONFESSIONS OF A PRICE CONTROLLER 167 (1974).
50. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 53 (statement of Peter J. Petkas).
Inadequate prior notice was given of the hearing, and the Price Commission refused to
release information about the requests for increased prices that were the subject matter of
the hearing. Id. at 53-54. Senator Proxmire termed the hearing "a kind of Alice in Won-
derland performance" since Chairman Grayson announced before the hearing that he had
decided to deny the price increases sought by the automobile manufacturers. 1972 Price
and Wage Control Hearings, supra note 47, at 189 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
51. 120 CONG. REc. 12,632-33 (1974) (amendment of Sen. Mathias). The amendment
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quired within forty-five days after the issuance of any rule, regula-
tion, or order that would have a substantial affect on the nation's
economy.5 2 It is highly unlikely, however, that this change in stat-
utory wording would have caused an understaffed agency, which
doubted the positive benefit of hearings,53 to actually conduct reg-
ular hearings. It is submitted that a system of regular hearings
could best be assured by requiring that hearings be held in all
cases in which rules, regulations, or orders having a major eco-
nomic effect, measured in objective monetary terms, are issued.
To guard against hearings becoming a sham, legislation could
provide for a public advocates office, charged with bringing ex-
perts and citizens with dissenting views before stabilization agen-
cies.5 4
B. Rulemaking
The rulemaking provisions of the APA, which require that no-
tice of proposed rules be published in the Federal Register and
provide for public participation in the rulemaking process through
the submission of comments, 55 were applicable to stabilization
agencies. However, the agencies were able to avoid to a large ex-
tent the regular notice and comment procedure by taking advan-
tage of the "good cause" exception.56 This exception allows an
agency to skirt the notice and comment procedure if such proce-
was adopted, but the Muskie amendment, which it modified, was later tabled. 120 CONG.
REC. 12,641 (1974). For a slightly different proposal, see S. 2954, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in Economic Stabiiization-1974: Hearings on S. 2599, S. 2892, S. 2895, S.
2954, S, 2961, S 2987, and S. 3023 Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 [herein-
after cited as 1974 Senate Hearings].
52. 120 CONG. REC. 12,633 (1974) (amendment of Sen. Mathias).
53. Stabilization officials doubted the positive benefit of regular public hearings, feel-
ing that they failed to provide views beyond those available through press reports. HISTOR-
ICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 64-65.
54. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, smpra note 8, at 56 (statement of Peter J.
Petkas). See generaly Public Particioation in Federal Agency Proceedings.- Hearings on S.
2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) provides:
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall
include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceed-
ings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
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dure is found to be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest." This finding, as well as a brief statement of rea-
sons, must be incorporated in the rule issued.57 During the stabili-
zation program, however, orders and regulations were issued
which did not comply with the good cause requirements. Never-
theless, these survived challenge in the courts.5" A serious and
comprehensive public comment process was conducted on only
one occasion.59 It has been argued that the regulations and the
stabilization program itself were less effective because of the lack
of opportunity for meaningful public comment,6" but program
officials contended that a formal notice and comment process was
unnecessary and inappropriate.61
C. Informing the Public
The translation of basic stabilization policy into the legal lan-
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice, or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and




58. E.g., DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974). In DeRieux, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the application and enforcement of the Phase I freeze with respect to the
Atlanta Falcons football team ticket prices. No finding that advance notice of the freeze
was "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest" had actually been made,
and no finding and statement was incorporated in the Executive order. Although noting
that this was a technical violation of§ 553(b)(3)(B), see note 56 supra, the court refused to
hold the order unenforceable on this ground, stating that good cause had existed in fact
and advance notice of the freeze would have served only to generate further increases.
59. The Cost of Living Council released for public comment the bulk of the Phase IV
regulations. By the end of a 12-day comment period, the Council received 671 comments
on the proposed regulations, with later arrivals bringing the total to over 800. The review
of these comments resulted in 20 major changes and 50 minor corrections of the regula-
tions. HISTORICAL WORKING PAERS, supra note 2, at 61, 85.
60. See, eg., 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 43 (statement of Prof.
Ernest Gellhorn).
61. It was felt that "the long intensive public debate about the Administration's eco-
nomic policies . . . did provide policy makers with considerable information about the
desires of different segments of the society." HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2,
at 64-65. More formal procedures for obtaining public comment were burdensome and
not cost effective since "the views of significant interests were easily available through the
press; their spokesmen often were unfamiliar with the complex problems posed by a com-
prehensive body of regulations and, thus, were unable to go beyond their public pro-
nouncements. ... Id. at 65.
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guage needed for regulations presented considerable difficulty.62
As soon as a policy decision was reached, the Price Commission
frequently would issue a press release providing a general descrip-
tion of the new policy.63 The regulation in final form, however,
often varied considerably from the policy announced and de-
scribed by the prior press release.' Notwithstanding the reliance
by businesses on the contents of such press releases, 65 the regula-
tions were held to be controlling even when they differed from the
earlier announcements. 66 Stabilization regulations were also con-
sidered difficult to understand67 in spite of the fact that they were
often deliberately general in nature to effectuate the desire for
simplicity and flexibility.68
Stabilization agencies did take a variety of steps beyond
the publication of rules in the Federal Register to inform
interested and affected parties of stabilization policies. In addition
to issuing numerous press releases69 and responding to literally
millions of inquiries, 70 there was a regular speaker's pro-
62. See HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1133-34; R. LANZILLOTTI, M.
HAMILTON & R. ROBERTS, PHASE I IN REVIEw: THE PRICE COMMISSION EXPERIENCE 33
(1975).
63. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1133.
64. This variance resulted because a press release contained only a very general
description of a policy, while final regulations required a major "fleshing out" of that pol-
icy. Id
65. Stabilization officials discovered that business people were making decisions re-
garding compliance with the stabilization program on the basis of reports in The Wall
Street Journal and other business publications. Id
66. E.g., United States v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 333 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La.
1971).
67. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 108-09 (statement of William
N. Walker, General Counsel, Cost of Living Council) (In an economic stabilization pro-
gram, "it is not going to be possible to set forth a series of rules and regulations that are
readily understandable to the layman or to the small businessman who does not come into
contact with the program.").
68. R. LANZILLOTrI, M. HAMILTON & R. ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 66, 200; A.
WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY: THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF 1971, at 51-53
(1973).
69. The Cost of Living Council issued numerous press releases, approximately 470 in
less than a two-year period, to a regular mailing list of approximately 2,800 names, and
maintained a larger mailing list of approximately 10,000 names for distribution of special
publications. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 115. The Wall Street Journal,
The New York Times, and The Washington Post often carried news releases verbatim. HIS-
TORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1152.
70. Through April 30, 1973, the Internal Revenue Service responded to 4,500,000 in-
quiries. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations For Fiscal Year
1974: Hearings Before a Subcomm of the House Comn. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 649 (1973) (statement of Edward F. Preston, Assistant Commissioner for Stabiliza-
tion, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Appropriations Hearings].
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gram,71 general coordination with trade associations, 7 2 and wide-
spread distribution of explanatory material concerning stabiliza-
tion policies.73 Commercial concerns also published looseleaf
binder services containing official stabilization material.74
D. Proposals to Improve Rulemaking
Various legislative proposals were designed to provide public
notice of proposed regulations and an increased opportunity for
comment. One proposal would have required a minimum ten-day
period for comment on all proposed rules, regulations, and or-
ders.75 The comment period, however, could have been waived
when strict compliance would have caused serious harm or injury
due to rapid inflation or shortages of vital commodities.76 In prac-
tical application, this proposal would have required little more
than the existing good cause exception under section 553 of the
APA. It did call for a more specific finding of potential harm
before the comment period could be waived.77 However, a change
of this nature probably would have had little effect unless the
courts were to scrutinize strictly the validity of an administrative
finding that the notice and comment provisions should be waived
because of the potential for serious harm. In addition, the short
See also H. YOSHPE, J. ALLUMS, J. RUSSEL & B. ATKIN, STEMMING INFLATION: THE
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE 90-DAY FREEZE 66-70 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as YOSHPE & ALLUMS].
71. Speakers' bureaus in the various stabilization agencies arranged speeches, confer-
ences, and presentations before trade and professional groups to discuss stabilization regu-
lations in detail. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1152, 1163, 1203-94. In
addition, agency officials and staff frequently appeared as guests on news programs. Id. at
1152. See also YOSHPE & ALLUMS, supra note 70, at 155-57.
72. See YOSHPE & ALLUMS, su.pra note 70, at 157-59.
73. During Phase I, a series of questions and answers explaining the operation of the
freeze was collected in booklet form. Ten million copies were published and distributed
widely throughout Internal Revenue Service district offices, Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service rural offices, and local post offices. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 2, at 1153.
74. Both the Commerce Clearing House and the Bureau of National Affairs published
loose-leaf binder services, respectively entitled Economic Controls and Federal Controls.
1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 115 (letter from Robert Bradford, Associ-
ate Director of Congressional Affairs, Cost of Living Council to Sen. Mathias (Dec. 11,
1973)).
75. 120 CONG. REC. 12,632-33 (1974) (amendment of Sen. Mathias). For a slightly
different proposal, see S. 2954, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 51, at 11.
76. 120 CONG. REC. 12,632-33 (1974) (amendment of Sen. Mathias).
77. Section 553(b)(3)(B) simply requires a finding that notice and comment proce-
dures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" before they may
be waived. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1976).
1979]
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ten-day comment period would not have provided adequate op-
portunity for effective comment. Only organizations which regu-
larly monitored the Federal Register and maintained staffs able to
analyze a proposed regulation and draft comments on short notice
would have been able to present their views for official considera-
tion by the stabilization agency. This problem, inherent in a no-
tice and comment procedure which does not provide for extensive
public interest representation in the administrative process, could
be alleviated somewhat by an adequately staffed and funded pub-
lic advocates office. 78
Another proposal would have eliminated the existing good
cause exception of section 553 of the APA and provided for a
more limited exception allowing an agency to omit notice and
comment procedures when it found they were unnecessary be-
cause of the "routine nature or insignificant impact" of the pro-
posed rule.79 Under a provision allowing for emergency rules, the
proposal would have permitted promulgation of rules without
public notice when an agency found that a delay in putting a rule
into effect would have seriously injured an important public inter-
est, substantially frustrated legislative policies, or seriously dam-
aged a person or class of persons without serving any important
public interest.8" Something similar to this proposal would be ap-
propriate for a future stabilization program. Emergency rules ef-
fective for a limited period of time could be issued, with public
comment invited on them. After receiving and analyzing these
comments, agency officials could make appropriate changes and
adopt new regulations. This procedure would only formalize the
process which often unfolds. Groups which are dissatisfied with
agency regulations will express that dissatisfaction to agency offi-
cials, and parties finding the regulations to be poorly drafted and
difficult to understand will voice their opinion to the agency, even
in the absence of procedures allowing and encouraging such ac-
tions.
78. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 56 (statement of Peter J.
Petkas).
79. H.R. 12,048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1976). This bill failed to pass the House of
Representatives under suspension of its rules. 122 CONG. REC. H10,718 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1976).
80. H.R. 12,048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1014, pt. I, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20-24 (1976).
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III. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING OF THE STABILIZATION
PROGRAM
The minimization of bureaucracy was an explicit goal of the
stabilization program,8" and it was a source of pride among ad-
ministration officials that the program was run by a relatively
small staff.82 The number of government workers employed in the
stabilization effort was far less than the number employed in past
programs83 and was not considered adequate for the wide-scale
system of controls being administered.84 Because of the small
number of workers employed in the stabilization effort, the costs
incurred by the government as a result of the program were fairly
limited. 5 However, major administrative costs were borne by
81. President Nixon was strongly opposed to a stabilization bureaucracy: "[W]hile the
wage-price freeze will be backed by Government sanctions, if necessary, it will not be ac-
companied by the establishment of a huge price control bureaucracy." President's Message
to the Nation, The Challenge of Peace, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1170 (Aug. 23,
1971). With regard to the Pay Board and Price Commission, the President stated, "Their
staffs will be small. Stabilization must be made to work by an all-volunteer army of patri-
otic citizens in every walk of life." President's Message to the Nation, The Continuing
Fight Against Inflation, id. at 1377 (Oct. I1, 1971). There was a feeling that a lightly staffed
agency would avoid excessively complicated procedures. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 129.
82. See A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 128-29.
83. There were never more than 4,100 personnel, including Internal Revenue Service
workers, employed in the stabilization program at any given time period. 1973 Senate Judi-
ciary Hearings supra note 8, at 93 (statement of Charles Emley, Assistant Director, Cost of
Living Council); C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 70. This compares with 16,000
personnel employed in the stabilization program during the Korean War and 60,000 to
70,000 personnel and over 100,000 volunteers employed in the World War II stabilization
effort. 1971 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Paul Porter, Direc-
tor, Office of Price Administration during World War II stabilization program); C. GRAY-
SON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 70.
84. During debate on the Economic Stabilization Act, it was estimated that a mini-
mum of 21,000 and as many as 130,000 government employees would be needed to admin-
ister stabilization controls. See 116 CONG. REC. 26,800 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Widnall).
During Phase II, the Price Commission estimated that it needed 1,100 employees; it was
authorized to hire only 600. C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 54-55.
85. Accurate figures on the cost of the stabilization program are available only for
fiscal years 1972 and 1973, shown below (in millions of dollars):
Fiscal 1972 Fiscal 1973 Total
Cost of Living Council
Price Commission 20.5 26.0 46.5
Pay Board I
Internal Revenue Service 34.5 40.3 74.8
Department of Justice 1.3 2.5 3.8
Total 56.3 68.8 125.1
R. LANzILLOTTI, M. HAMILTON & R. ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 190-91. A Cost of Living
Council study estimated that the annual cost to the government of a Phase II type of stabi-
lization program, calculated at January 1974 salary rates, would be $108 million, compared
with $78 million for a Phase III type of program, and $100 million for a Phase IV type of
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those who had to comply with stabilization regulations.8 6 Fur-
thermore, the stabilization program resulted in economic distor-
tions and dislocations.87
The government largely used existing agencies such as the Of-
fice of Emergency Planning,88 the Internal Revenue Service, 89 and
program. Economic Stabiiization-1974: Hearings on H.R. 13206 Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1974) (statement of John T. Dunlop,
Director, Cost of Living Council) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Hearings].
86. In February 1974, the Cost of Living Council estimated the cost to business of
compliance with the stabilization program at between $700 million and $2 billion annually.
1974 House Hearings, supra note 85, at 62 (statement of John T. Dunlop). A poll of its
membership conducted by the National Association of Manufacturers found the average
cost of compliance to be $26,854 for companies with annual revenues under $50 million
and $174,865 for companies with annual revenues over $50 million. NATIONAL ASS'N OF
MANUFACTURERS, INDUSTRY SURVEY ON WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS 29, reprinted in
1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 311, 340.
87. Product shortages were created when firms cut back on production because of
insufficient profits or when they exported an increased number of goods to exploit foreign
markets not subject to the controls. NATIONAL ASS'N OF MANUFACTURERS, INDUSTRY
SURVEY ON WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS 5, 9, 11, 27, reprinted in 1973 Senate Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 8, at 316, 320, 322, 338. In addition, traditional institutional arrange-
ments, such as collective bargaining, were disrupted. It was not unusual for contracts be-
tween labor unions and corporate management to expire before the wage increases
contained in them were approved by the Pay Board or the Cost of Living Council. This
was viewed as having a chaotic and stifling effect on contract negotiations. 1974 House
Hearings, supra note 85, at 369 (statement of Leon B. Schachter, Vice President, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters Union). It was alleged that some businesses were able to effectively
short-circuit union organizing campaigns by explaining that wage increases would be lim-
ited to a set percentage by the government even if employees had a union agreement. Id.
Moreover, it has been submitted that any control on wages agreed to by employee and
employer and any controls on the price of goods or services agreed to by private parties
infringes the freedom of contract. See A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 129. It has also been
argued that the application of stabilization authority to contracts for salary increases en-
tered into prior to the date of the statutory enactment but designed to take effect after
enactment constituted a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the
fifth amendment. See, e.g., New Economic Program Hearings, supra note 8, at 432 (state-
ment of Prof. Arthur S. Miller). This argument, however, was rejected by the courts.
Western States Meat Packers Ass'n v. Dunlop, 482 F.2d 1401, 1403-04 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1973) (price increase); Local 11, IBEW v. Boldt, 481 F.2d 1392, 1395 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (wage increase).
88. The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) was assigned to administer the Phase I
freeze program because one of its national emergency functions was the development of
economic stabilization plans. Although this responsibility was carried out by only one per-
son, the OEP was the only agency with a bureaucratic commitment in this area. The OEP
also had a national field structure, which included a sophisticated computer-assisted com-
munications network, and maintained a roster of personnel in other government agencies
who could be assigned to duties in a stabilization program. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at
24-25.
89. The Internal Revenue Service was brought into the stabilization program on Au-
gust 19, 1971, to carry out the informational and compliance functions. It was chosen for
this task because of its network of district and subdistrict offices, its highly visible enforce-
ment capability, and its recognized competence in communicating complex rules and regu-
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the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service90 to ad-
minister the program. In addition, the Cost of Living Council and
subordinate agencies developed their own staffs. 91 Stabilization
agencies hired employees directly and also made use of detailees
on temporary assignment from other federal agencies.92 At the
inception of the program, when a legal staff and office support had
to be assembled quickly, a significant portion of the program's
employees were detailees, many of whom were assigned involun-
tarily.93 One major problem in building a legal staff for the new
agencies was the reluctance of many lawyers to join an agency
that could be phased out at any time.94 Detailees were assigned to
stabilization agencies with the understanding that they could be
sent back to their parent agency or department if their work was
not considered adequate,95 and many staff lawyers were not re-
tained in the stabilization program.96 Those who volunteered for
detail to stabilization agencies were often attracted by the uncom-
mon opportunities for civil service grade advancement and the re-
sultant increase in pay.9 7 In general, the work of office support
detailees warranted no particular commendation.98
After the initial stages of the program, the majority of employ-
ees were hired by the stabilization agencies themselves,99 gener-
ally as "emergency indefinites."'' ° This permitted the selection,
lations to the public in a relatively simple manner. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 25-26;
N.Y. Times, July 20, 1973, at 8, col. 6.
90. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service was brought into the pro-
gram to utilize its extensive network of county offices in rural areas as information centers
and to funnel complaints of violations to Internal Revenue Service offices for action. A.
WEBER, supra note 68, at 26.
91. C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 53-54.
92. The detailing of Executive employees to stabilization agencies was authorized by
Congress. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 212(e),
85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973).
93. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1135.
94. Id See also Askin, supra note 12, at 32.
95. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1135.
96. Only 3 of 10 detailees assigned to the Office of General Counsel at the Price Com-
mission were retained. Id.
97. Id; Askin, supra note 12, at 32. When detailed employees returned to their for-
mer agencies, civil service rules guaranteed most of them a job at their original grade.
However, the agency, although strongly encouraged to do so, was under no obligation to
maintain an employee's salary at the rate attained while working for the stabilization pro-
gram. 5 C.F.R. § 352.601-.608 (1978); HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at
1410; Askin, supra note 12, at 32.
98. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1135.
99. As of November 19, 1973, less than one-third of the Cost of Living Council em-
ployees were detailees. See id at 1409.
100. Id.; C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 53.
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hiring, and firing of employees without the encumbrances of the
Civil Service registers or any other official merit system, thus al-
lowing the stabilization agencies the flexibility to vary their em-
ployee levels rapidly.' Nevertheless, despite the stimulating
challenges offered, 112 the stabilization agencies had difficulty
recruiting employees.' 0 3 Economists, in particular, were not well
represented in the stabilization agencies for a variety of political,
professional, and personal reasons."
The staffing problems encountered during the stabilization
program are, perhaps, not surprising. On the one hand, an emer-
gency program must have the flexibility allowed by freedom from
Civil Service regulations. On the other hand, a certain amount of
security and permanence may be necessary to recruit and main-
tain quality personnel. A large, permanent staff, however, might
develop bureaucratic tendencies toward complicated procedures
and self-perpetuation.0 5 A partial solution would be the mainte-
nance of some permanent staff members in an agency who would
monitor the economy and be prepared in a contingency to per-
form stabilization functions.'0 6 To some extent, the Council on
Wage and Price Stability, an eight-member Executive-appointed
board created in 1974, which with staff assistance monitors the
economy, fills this role. 10 7 In any future stabilization program,
I01. "Emergency indefinite" employees were subject to termination without cause at
any time after 30 days of employment. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at
1409. However, many office directors were reluctant to discharge employees because of the
difficulties and pressures involved in such actions. Id. at 1136.
102. See C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 61-62; Askin, supra note 12, at 32.
103. Many individuals were unwilling to work in the program because of the inherent
lack of job security offered by an agency destined to be phased out on short notice. HIs-
TORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1135. The recruitment of employees was also
said to be hampered by salary levels below those of the private sector and by the lack of
reimbursement for employee moving expenses. C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB, upra note 49, at
53.
104. Experience with the Price Commission indicated that agency officials did not fully
appreciate the need for economists. Additionally, some economists opposed the use of
broad economic controls and refused to be associated with them, while others sympathetic
to the controls program were either reluctant to work for the Nixon administration or un-
able to free themselves from prior commitments. The combination of these factors resulted
in a maximum of 15 to 20 professional economists working at the Price Commission at any
one time. Askin, supra note 12, at 24, 30, 31.
105. See A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 128-29.
106. Near the end of the stabilization period, the Nixon administration proposed turn-
ing the Cost of Living Council into such a smaller economic monitoring agency. HIsTO~i-
CAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 168-69.
107. The Council was established by the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 note (1978 Supp.)). Its
authority was most recently extended by the Act of Oct. 6, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-121, § 1, 91
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employees of this agency could form the nucleus of a larger staff.
Council employees would be experienced at monitoring the econ-
omy by analyzing economic information-such as reports on
wages, prices, costs, profits, productivity, sales, and imports and
exports-since such analysis is part of the Council's statutory
function.0 8 Opposition to such a permanent entity is based partly
on the fear that the power to develop voluntary remedies could
develop into the power to impose mandatory wage and price con-
trols. 0 9
IV. PROCEDURES FOR EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FROM
REGULATIONS
During the stabilization program, selected areas of the econ-
omy were relieved of the controls entirely through an exemption
process. Relief from one or several of the controls was achieved
through an exception process. ' 0 Similar criteria were applied to
exemption and exception requests: "serious hardship" or "gross
inequity" had to be shown to merit relief from the controls. The
serious hardship standard involved an assessment of the impact of
the regulations on the financial situation of the requesting firm;
the gross inequity criterion focused on the impact of the regula-
tions on the position of the firm relative to other firms in the in-
dustry and relative to similarly situated firms in all industries."'
The party requesting an exemption or exception also had to
demonstrate that financial hardship resulted from the imposition
of the controls and that other avenues of relief available under the
regulations had been exhausted." 2
Stat. 1091, until September 30, 1979. For a description of Council activities and a proposal
to expand its powers, see Note, supra note 2, at 378-410.
108. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, § 3(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 note (1978
Supp.).
109. See 123 CONG. REc. S15,275 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower)
("[l]nformal and voluntary guidelines have a way of becoming something more than origi-
nally intended and they seduce us into thinking that mandatory controls will work where
voluntary controls have failed. And mandatory controls are a bankrupt economic policy
for any nation.").
110. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 644-45. Class exceptions con-
sisted of requests from similar firms seeking relief from one or several of the controls,
rather than from all regulations. The criteria applied to these requests were similar to those
applied to individual requests for exception. Id.
11l. Id. Since a decision on an exemption affected an entire industry, it was essentially
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A. Exemptions
At its inception, the stabilization program had broad, almost
all-inclusive coverage of economic activity.1 3 Everything except
interest rates,114 corporate profits," 5  dividends," 16 government
taxes, 1 7 imports and exports, 1 8 and raw agricultural products," 19
113. Some people active in past stabilization programs considered an initial period of
broad controls to be essential to the success of the program. Michael V. DiSalle, former
Director of the Office of Price Stabilization and former Administrator of Economic Stabili-
zation, supported such controls, based on the history of economic controls in World War I,
World War II, and the Korean War. In each of these contexts, attempts to use voluntary
controls failed and severe inflation continued unabated. In World War II and the Korean
War, it eventually became necessary to institute mandatory controls. Mandatory controls
were not used during World War I and this contributed to the severe recession of the early
1920's. 1971 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 5, at 60-63 (statement of Michael V.
DiSalle).
114. The Act, as originally enacted, did not explicitly give the President power to con-
trol interest rates. The Nixon administration used this as a justification for not applying
controls to these items. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 37. Explicit authority for the regula-
tion of interest rates was provided in the Credit Control Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1909
(1976), but the administration deemed this law inapplicable because it was designed to deal
with credit shortages, a condition which did not prevail at the time. A. WEBER, supra note
68, at 39. The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,
§ 203(a)(2), 85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973), specifically granted the President the power to
control interest rates, but no controls were ever instituted. Controls were not applied to
interest rates, in part because the administration found that interest rates were declining
and it concluded that controls were unnecessary. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 40-41.
115. No controls were applied to profits partly because the administration felt that cor-
porate profits were already relatively narrow. In fact, the ratio of corporate profits for all
industries (before taxes and with inventory valuation adjustment) to gross national private
product had been steadily declining during the 1964-71 period. A. WEBER, supra note 68,
at 38-39. President Nixon stated that "higher profits in the American economy would be
good for every person in America." He added that higher profits would be conducive to
business expansion, thus creating new jobs; stimulate investments, thus making American
goods more competitive, both at home and abroad; and provide added tax revenues. Presi-
dent's Message to the Nation, The Post-Freeze Economic Stabilization Program, 7
WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1378 (Oct. 11, 1971).
116. No controls were applied to dividends partly because a ceiling on dividend pay-
ments would permit a corporation to retain a larger percentage of its earnings, theoretically
increasing the value of its stock. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 38-41. However, there was
an effort to secure voluntary compliance with a dividend freeze and, as part of that effort,
the Secretary of Commerce sent telegrams to about 1,300 major corporations requesting
their cooperation. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 80 (Jan. 1972).
117. Although there was a heavy demand for controlling property and other taxes, no
serious consideration was ever given to their inclusion in the Phase I freeze. A. WEBER,
supra note 68, at 41.
118. Imports and exports were exempted from controls to help improve the relative
position of American goods in domestic and foreign markets and to provide a stimulus to
American production and employment. Id at 42-43.
119. Unprocessed agricultural products were exempted from controls based on a mix-
ture of historical, administrative, and economic factors: such products were excluded from
past stabilization controls; there was a fear of shortages and the emergence of black mar-
[Vol. 29:458
1979] ECONOMIC CONTROLS .ADMINISTPATION 479
was subject to control. The reasons for this broad coverage were a
concern for equity and the appearance of equity, and a desire to
emphasize the President's intention to deal seriously with infla-
tion. t1 0 The first rationale, at least, was probably overstated. It is
questionable whether the inclusion of such items as objects of
art,12 1 used cars, 122 and stamps sold to collectors 2 3 significantly
affected the public's sense of equity, particularly when raw agri-
cultural products-which were highly visible-were exempted
from the initial freeze without any severe public complaint. 124
The stabilization program's attempt at broad coverage resulted in
the diversion of an inordinate amount of scarce administrative re-
sources into peripheral economic areas which had little signifi-
cance or impact in terms of the objectives of the program. Thus,
there developed a desire and a necessity for exempting additional
sectors of the economy from the coverage of the stabilization
program.' 25  During Phase II, major exemptions granted in-
cluded those of all firms with sixty or less employees, 126 the wages
and salaries of professional athletes,2 7 federal employee sala-
kets; the administrative burden of maintaining even a pretense of controls on these prod-
ucts was insuperable; and many raw agricultural commodities were subject to price support
programs and, if prices were not permitted to rise, government purchases might be required
by law. Id at 41-42.
120. Id. at 126; ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 84 (Jan. 1972).
121. During the Phase I freeze period, a work of art could not be sold for more than the
price of the most "comparable work" sold during the 30-day base period prior to August
15, 1971. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 66-67.
122. The price of a used car could be no more than the price of that car, or a similar
car, during the 30-day base period. Id. at 126.
123. After an impassioned plea from the American Philatelic Society, the Cost of Liv-
ing Council ruled that the price of stamps bought and sold by collectors could not be
increased during the freeze period. Id. at 67.
124. Id at 126. For a discussion of the general unenforceability of such provisions, see
id. at 67.
125. ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 108 (Jan. 1972); C. GRAYSON & L. NEEB,
supra note 49, at 16; A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 131. The Economic Report argued that
excluding sectors from control "should not be interpreted as signs of the weakening of the
system or portents of its early termination. They may, in fact, make the system stronger
and more durable by permitting the administrative effort to be concentrated on the sectors
most significant for inflation." ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 108 (Jan. 1972).
126. HIsTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 342-44; A. WEBER, supra note 68,
at 131.
127. Consideration of the issue of pay for professional athletes originated with a re-
quest for a ruling as to whether Vida Blue of the Oakland Athletics baseball team could
receive a salary increase from $14,000 to $92,000 per year. After determining that the
salaries of professional athletes had little economic significance and fearing that unsuccess-
ful attempts to control such highly visible salaries would affect public compliance with the
stabilization program, the Pay Board, after much study and consideration, informally re-
quested the Cost of Living Council to grant the exception, which the Council did. No
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ries, 128 and the wages of those earning less than $2.75 per hour. 129
During Phase IV, most sectors of the economy were gradually ex-
empted or decontrolled as part of the termination policy.
B. Exceptions
The regulations governing the stabilization program were rela-
tively general. No attempt was made to deal with special needs
and problems in the regulations; these were to be met by the
granting of an exception from the applicable regulation. 130  The
provision of the Stabilization Act which stated that stabilization
"orders and regulations may provide for the making of such ad-
justments as may be necessary to prevent gross inequities" '131
similar exemption was granted to the entertainment industry, largely because there were no
highly visible cases or strong pressures for exemption. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 2, at 340-41.
128. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 131. This exemption did not extend to employees of
the United States Postal Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority, or other groups of em-
ployees whose pay was not covered by the Federal Civil Service plan. HISTORICAL WORK-
ING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 340.
129. The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,
§ 203(d), 83 Stat. 743 (expired 1973), required that "wage increases to any individual whose
earnings are substandard or who is a member of the working poor shall not be limited in
any manner, until such time as his earnings are no longer substandard or he is no longer a
member of the working poor." The Cost of Living Council initially exempted only em-
ployees earning less than $1.90 per hour from controls, but this limited exemption was
found to be inadequate in Jennings v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 409 (D.D.C. 1972), and all
employees earning less than $2.75 per hour were exempted from controls. This exemption
was upheld in Jennings v. Schultz, 355 F. Supp. 1198 (D.D.C. 1972). See HISTORICAL
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 345-47.
130. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 39 (statement of Edward
Dunkelberger, Attorney, Covington & Burling).
There were, in fact, numerous requests for exceptions. Between August 15, 1971 and
June 30, 1974, stabilization agencies completed action on over 8,100 requests for exceptions
and 600 requests for reconsideration relating to price matters. These figures do not include
requests related to health, rent, or wage regulations. Nearly two-thirds of the requests were
submitted during the two freeze periods. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at
646. By late 1973, there had been a total of 51,850 requests for exceptions, of which 2,247
(4.3%) were granted, 12,865 (24.8%) were denied, and 1,408 (2.7%) were pending. The total
number of exception requests received was greater than the total of exceptions granted,
denied, or pending because of three factors. First, approximately 6,000 requests were
counted twice due to inter-agency transfers of requests; second, changes in the stabilization
policy, from one phase to another, rendered many requests moot; and third, many requests
did not require any decision since relief was already provided in regulations or the request
required only interpretation of certain regulations, not an exception from the regulations.
1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 110 (letter from Robert Bradford, Associ-
ate Director of Congressional Affairs, Cost of Living Council, to Sen. Mathias (Dec. 11,
1973)).




strongly implied the power to establish an administrative process
for the granting of exceptions. Moreover, some considered the es-
tablishment and administration of an effective exceptions proce-
dure essential to finding that the stabilization program was
constitutional.132
1. Regulations Governing Exceptions
The regulations adopted by the Cost of Living Council gov-
erning the granting of exceptions were vague. 133 They did not go
far beyond the language of the Stabilization Act, stating only that
exceptions "may be granted for the purpose of preventing or cor-
recting a serious hardship or gross inequity."' 34 With only general
regulations and scant official criteria governing exceptions from
regulations, stabilization agencies had great flexibility and discre-
tion. While this flexibility was beneficial in allowing prompt ac-
tion to be taken on urgent problems, 35 it was easily subject to
abuse through favoritism and ad hoc and inconsistent decision-
making. 3
6
Although the regulations did not provide criteria for determin-
ing hardship and inequity, certain criteria came to be accepted as
indicative of these factors: inadequate cash flow to service debt
obligations; declining over time of standard accounting indices
such as current ratio, debt to equity ratio, return on investment,
return on equity, capital turnover ratio, and operating profit mar-
gin; and any special, recognized measure of financial condition
suggested by the party requesting the exception. 137 During the
Phase I freeze and the freeze period at the end of Phase III, hard-
ship criteria were narrowed to an assessment of whether a party
132. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings supra note 8, at 46 (statement of Prof. Ernest
Gellhorn); Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971), discussed in notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
133. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings supra note 8, at 46 (statement of Prof. Ernest Gell-
horn).
134. 6 C.F.R. § 155.41 (1973) (repealed 1973).
135. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 71 (statement of William N.
Walker, General Counsel, Cost of Living Council).
136. See id. at 43, 48 (statement of Prof. Ernest Gellhorn). GelLhorn stated that, on the
basis of information publicly available, one might conjecture that decisions on exception
requests were made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 48. There were allegations of corruption
and favoritism in the administration of the exceptions process, and at least one investiga-
tion of the charges was made by the Watergate Special Prosecutor. See 119 CONG. REC.
42,353 (1973) (extension of remarks by Rep. Fraser); 31 CONG. Q. 724 (Mar. 27, 1974).
137. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 661-63.
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could survive the freeze.' 38 Gross inequity criteria required more
subjective analysis than did the serious hardship tests, 139 and in-
cluded, but were not limited to, an assessment of whether the reg-
ulations caused one or more of the following: disruption of
normal business practices; product pricing at or below cost; re-
striction on internal replacement or expansion capital, or disincen-
tive to plan replacement or expansion; curtailment or
discontinuance of product or produce line production or sales;
conflict with court decrees or regulations of other government
agencies; unequal competitive position compared to similar firms
in the same industry; inadequate supply of raw materials caused
by the inability to buy at the regulated price; and the application
of historically unrepresentative limitations such as base period
profit margin, base price, and base cost period.14
During the Phase I freeze and the freeze period at the end of
Phase III, inequity other than local supply or market distortions
did not provide operative criteria for relief. 4 ' Additionally, the
effect of a denial of an exception on third parties was considered.
Here such factors as the following were considered: the employ-
ment impact on the local community or region; the impact on in-
dustries supplying raw materials to or purchasing products from
the firm making application for exception; the impact on minority
stockholders of the firm or its subsidiary; product and supply dis-
tortions, both current and prospective; the impact on the competi-
tive structure of the industry; the impact on capital investments,
including shifts from domestic to foreign investment; the impact
on technological and productivity enhancing investments; and the
impact on price stability in other industries. 142 While these crite-
ria were generally accepted as indicative of hardship and inequity,
they were still broad and were not publicly known. As a result,
they did little to limit the discretion in the exceptions process. 143
138. Id. at 682-83; A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 80-82. During the Phase I freeze,
impending bankruptcy per se was not sufficient justification for an exception. A petitioning
party also had to prove that it had not contributed to its difficulties and that all other
alternatives had been exhausted. Id. at 81-82.
139. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 663.
140. Id. at 664-65.
141. Id. at 682-83.
142. Id. at 665.
143. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 22 (statement of Edward
Dunkelberger, Attorney, Covington & Burling).
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2. Administration of the Exceptions Process
Petitions for exceptions to stabilization regulations were first
analyzed and reviewed by agency staff analysts, generally lawyers
and accountants, to determine if relief was necessary. 44 A deter-
mination was then made whether additional data was needed to
evaluate the exception request, and, in many cases, additional
data was requested. Representatives of many businesses re-
quested informal conferences to present their cases for exceptions,
and conferences were held at a stabilization agency's discretion.145
After adequate data was collected, a detailed analysis was pre-
pared for presentation to the Exceptions Reconsiderations Com-
mittee.
During Phase IV, the Committee was composed of three Cost
of Living Council officials-the Director of the Exceptions Divi-
sion, who served as chairperson, the Director of Economic Policy
and Analysis or the Deputy Director, and the General Counsel or
the Deputy General Counsel." After hearing a brief oral sum-
mary of the prepared analysis and discussing the matter, the Com-
mittee reached a decision. If it considered the case to have major
policy or precedential impact, it was referred to a higher
level-during Phase IV to the Executive Committee or the Depu-
ties Group-for review and decision. 47 After a final decision was
reached, a Decision and Order was prepared to communicate the
decision to the petitioning party and the public.' 48 This entire
144. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 648. See generally Bacon, Govern-
ment Price-Contro/Analysts Play Key Role in Ruling on Requesisfor Boosts by Many Firms,
Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1972, at 38, col. 1. In many cases petitioners sought approval of
conduct already permitted under the regulations. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 2, at 652-53.
145. Id. at 653-54.
146. Id. at 653-56. During Phase IV, all requests by food manufacturers, food whole-
salers, and food retailers were decided by the Food Review Group, which consisted of the
Administrator of the Office of Food and representatives of the Office of Economic Policy,
the General Counsel, the Office of Operations, the Office of Compliance, and the National
Office of the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 656.
147. Id. at 654.
148. Id. at 656-58. Examples of Decisions and Orders are reprinted in id. at 688-96. A
Decision and Order was issued with the signature of a high stabilization official. In theory,
the Committee's decision was only a recommendation to this official, but in practice there
were only a few cases in which the Committee was requested to review its initial decision.
Id. at 656-57. Among officials who had signature authority during various phases of the
stabilization program were the Executive Director, the Deputy Director, and the Director
of the Office of Price Operations of the Price Commission, the Administrator of the Office
of Price Stabilization, and the Deputy Director of the Cost of Living Council. Id.
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process took four to five weeks for an average case. 149 If the peti-
tioner was not satisfied with the result, a request for reconsidera-
tion could be made.
1 50
Among the criticisms raised concerning the exceptions proce-
dure were its deleterious impact on small businesses and the fail-
ure to develop clear, publicly known standards for exceptions
through the orders and decisions. The burden on small businesses
caused some concern because it was thought that the necessity of
compiling supporting data for a successful exception request, as
well as the complexity of the process, would, as a practical matter,
force smaller businesses to sustain possibly burdensome general
regulations. 151 Various proposals, such as the exemption of all
firms below a certain size from controls152 and the establishment
of a corps of attorneys to aid small businesspeople in dealings
with stabilizations agencies,153 were advanced to relieve this bur-
den. As a result, on May 1, 1972, firms with sixty or fewer em-
ployees and less than $50 million in sales or revenues were
exempted from the controls.'
54
Although the agencies published their exception decisions,
these decisions were of little benefit in developing a body of prece-
dent setting out clear, widely known standards for exceptions. 55
149. Id. at 655.
150. Id. at 644. Exception requests were handled during Phase I by the Office of Emer-
gency Preparedness in its national office and each regional office. Id. at 648. See YOSHPE
& ALLUMS, supra note 70, at 99-104. Most exception requests in Phase II, Phase III, and
the Phase III freeze were decided by the Price Commission; however, during Phase IV most
exception requests were handled by the Cost of Living Council. HISTORICAL WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 648. Limited authority to handle exceptions was granted to the
Internal Revenue Service and exercised through its district offices during Phase II and
Phase IV. Id. at 648-50. Reconsiderations, however, were still handled for the most part
by other agencies until a period toward the end of Phase IV. Id. at 649-50. During Phase
IV, the Cost of Living Council handled 67% of all reconsideration requests. Id. at 650.
151. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 43,243 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
152. Congress considered, but rejected, proposals to exempt all firms below a certain
size from controls. See S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1971] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2286; 117 CONG. REc. 43,686 (1971) (remarks of Sen.
Proxmire). Instead, Congress directed that exemptions from controls be provided for small
businesses to the extent feasible without impeding the stabilization program. Economic
Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 214(b)(2), 85 Stat. 743 (ex-
pired 1973).
153. 1971 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 5, at 510 (statement of Ralph Nader).
154. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at iii; A. WEBER, supra note 68, at
131 n.4. Firms involved in construction or health care were excluded from this exemption.
HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at iii; A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 131 n.4.
155. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 56 (statement of Peter J.
Petkas, Attorney, Corporate Accountability Research Group). But see HISTORICAL WORK-
ING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 657 (decisions did communicate precedent).
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The decisions were generally brief and not accompanied by opin-
ions, findings, or precedential terms. t56 Often, a decision was the
result of prior informal contacts, negotiations, and compromises
reached between agency staff and the representative of an industry
or company.157 Thus, the formal decision frequently did not re-
flect the policy considerations of the decision-makers and was of
precedential value only to the party that petitioned for the excep-
tion.1 58 Under these circumstances, judicial review of decisions
denying exceptions was difficult. The courts were frustrated by an
inadequate record and lack of specific standards governing indi-
vidual requests for exceptions. 59 However, agency decisions were
invariably upheld by courts on the basis that flexibility and re-
sponsiveness justified the lack of standards governing excep-
tions. 60
3. Proposed Reforms of the Exceptions Process
The Government in the Sunshine Act,' 6' enacted in 1976, pro-
hibits ex parte contacts between agency decisionmakers and all
persons outside the agency where the purpose of the contact is to
discuss the merit of any hearing before the agency. 62 To a certain
extent, this restriction would promote fairness and equity in an
exceptions process during a stabilization program by restricting
the advantage of parties that enjoy greater access to agency offi-
cials. The Sunshine Act places restrictions on ex parte contacts
because of the concern that such contacts do not allow other inter-
156. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 48 (statement of Prof. Ernest Gell-
horn); id. at 56, 62 (statement of Peter J. Petkas).
157. Id. Petkas repeated allegations that the only way to get action on an exception
request was to talk to an agency staff official "off the record" and have that person agree to
the granting of the exception since formal petitions and letters were rarely acknowledged
and, perhaps, not even considered by stabilization agencies. Id See also Bacon, Govern-
ment Price-ControlAnalysts Play Key Role in Ruling on Requesisfor Boosts by Many Firms,
Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1972, at 38, coL 2.
158. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 56, 62 (statement of Peter J.
Petkas). This was said to have led to a "secret law" or body of precedent known only to
agency staff and certain Washington lawyers and law firms. Id. at 62; "The Fina-
glers'--Lawyers, Consultants Kept Busy by Phase 2, But Can They Help Ou., Wall St. J.,
Dec. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 6. It was said that "one pipeline directly into the government's
controls bureaucracy is worth a thousand seminars." Id. at 27, col. 2.
159. 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 51 (statement of Prof. Ernest Gell-
horn).
160. Id. at 51-52.
161. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 552, 552b, 556, 557 (1976).
162. Id. § 557(d)(l)(A), (B).
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ested parties to counter the arguments presented.1 63 This ration-
ale, however, is not directly applicable to an exception request
since it is not an adversary proceeding with contesting parties. In
addition, it is unlikely that the penalty of the Sunshine
Act- dismissal or a possible decision on the merits against a party
knowingly making improper contact, applied at the discretion of
the agency involved6A----would be an adequate deterrent. This is
because stabilization agency officials would be disinclined to pe-
nalize parties making improper contacts, since in the past ex parte
contacts had been at least tacitly approved by these same offi-
cials.1 65 Therefore, something beyond applying the Sunshine Act
to stabilization agencies would seem to be necessary. In certain
cases decisions reached on the basis of ex parte contacts can be
challenged on due process grounds.' 66 However, the possibility
for outside enforcement of judicially developed restrictions on ex
parte contacts is limited by the fact that these contacts, by their
very nature, are difficult to detect. The best solution would be to
establish more specific and understandable regulations, thus re-
ducing the number of exception requests, and to better staff the
exceptions procedure so that officially filed petitions alone would
be sufficient to bring appropriate relief.'67
V. ENFORCEMENT OF STABILIZATION CONTROLS
Although the architects of the stabilization program relied pri-
marily on voluntary compliance with wage and price controls, an
attempt was made to develop an overall enforcement strategy
which included administrative sanctions and litigation. ' 68 The en-
forcement mechanisms of the Stabilization Act provided for suits
for damages, writs of injunction, declaratory judgments, and
criminal fines. 169 Original jurisdiction for all suits arising under
163. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(D) (1976).
165. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 56, 62 (statement of Peter J.
Petkas).
166. E.g., Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
167. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 45, 52 (statement of Prof.
Ernest Gellhorn); N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1971, at 32, col. 4 (open letter from Chester
Bowles, former Administrator, Office of Price Administration), cited in 1971 House Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 5, at 564. Bowles stated that stabilization agencies must promul-
gate reasonably precise regulations to avoid being swamped with special appeals and
subjected to political pressures. Id.
168. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1053.
169. The Act as passed in 1970 provided for a $5,000 fine for willful violation of any
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the Act lay in the federal district courts, regardless of the amount
in controversy.' 70 To achieve consistency, appeals from the dis-
trict court decisions, as well as all constitutional issues, were de-
cided by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.
17 1
Decisions of the Emergency Court could be taken to the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari.'17  However, mainly because of the
limited number of agency officials, stabilization regulations were
not strictly enforced 73 and compliance remained largely volun-
tary.
A. Enforcement of Wage Controls
The enforcement that took place was concentrated heavily in
the area of rents and prices. During Phase II, less than 3% of the
total compliance effort was directed towards wages, and there was
order or regulation and allowed for the issuance of injunctions against violators of any
order or regulation. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 204-205,
84 Stat. 799 (expired 1971). The Act was amended in 1971 to provide additional enforce-
ment mechanisms. A criminal fine of not more than $5,000 for each violation of any order
or regulation was added; the provision for injunctive relief was expanded; restitution of
moneys received in violation of any order or regulation was specifically allowed at the
discretion of a court; and provisions were added allowing private treble damage suits for
intentional overcharges in the renting of property or in the sale of goods or services in
violation of any order or regulation. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-210, §§ 208-210, 85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973).
170. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(a),
85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973).
171. Id. The court consisted of a three-judge panel comprised of federal district court
and circuit court judges appointed by the Chief Justice. Id. § 211(b).
172. Id.§211(f).
173. See A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 67.
[I]n many instances. . . effective control was a practical impossibility because of
the nature of the commodities. . . or technical problems of enforcement beyond
the capabilities of the existing staff. . . . The general strategy was to create suffi-
cient restraint, if not uncertainty, so that the sellers would have a bias in favor of
the status quo and lower prices rather than higher prices.
Id. Ralph Nader stated that "[blusiness has learned to understand what toothless tigers are
like and how to work with them. The Price Commission was a classic example of a regula-
tory charade in this respect." Executive Compensation Hearings, supra note 48, at 176. Na-
der cited Phase II as "the most flagrant and systematic nonenforcement of Federal
regulations in the history of our Government." Id. at 175.
One commentator has suggested that the Nixon administration was indifferent to effec-
tive enforcement since the economic controls were primarily an external signal to foreign
nations. See Askin, supra note 12, at 33. Controls were instituted by the Nixon adminis-
tration at the same time the convertibility of the dollar was suspended and a short time
before the dollar was devalued. Thus, the controls may have been instituted to show for-
eign nations that the United States intended to control domestic inflation rather than sim-
ply export it via exchange rate manipulations. Id. For a critical account of Nixon
administration economic policies, see L. SILK, NIXONOMICS: HOW THE DISMAL SCIENCE
OF FREE ENTERPRISE BECAME THE BLACK ART OF CONTROLS (1972).
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no formal pay compliance program in Phase III.114 There was
little enforcement effort in the area of wages since there were rela-
tively few public complaints about wage increases: of the alleged
violations reported during Phase I, only 6% related to wages,
while 75% involved prices, and 19% involved rents.'7 5 This can be
explained by the fact that the 5.5% standard for pay increases
adopted during Phase II received such public support that a strong
compliance effort was deemed unnecessary, 176 and by the natural
incentive of businesses to hold down employee wages. 177 Further,
a sizeable percentage of wage earners were exempted legislatively
from wage controls. 17  Moreover, the administration believed
that strict enforcement of wage controls would be politically un-
sound. While administrative action calling for price rollbacks or
imposing penalties on price gougers is bound to receive public ap-
proval, penalizing employers for granting substantial general pay
increases is unlikely to receive similar approval.
79
The major government effort was directed toward encouraging
voluntary compliance with pay guidelines through noncoercive
mediation of employee-employer wage disputes.' 80 Approxi-
mately one-fourth of the wage increase investigations conducted
during the program were the result of outside complaints.''
Other investigations developed as a result of Internal Revenue
Service audits usually performed to detect violations of price regu-
lations, or through other channels, such as spot checks.' 82 On the
174. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 107-08. During Phase II, the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice received almost 156,000 complaints, only about 4,000 of which concerned wages.
Mitchell, The Impact and Administration of Wage Controls, in WAGE AND PRICE CON-
TROLS, supra note 2, at 50.
175. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 716.
176. Id. at 719. Internal Revenue Service field agents objected to this lack of enforce-
ment and were anxious to pursue technical violations of wage regulations. Mitchell, supra
note 174, at 51.
177. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 719. Businesses resisted wage
demands and frequently informed the Pay Board when unions demanded pay hikes greater
than the Phase II guidelines. Id.
178. The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, § 3, 87
Stat. 27 (expired 1973), exempted those earning $3.50 or less per hour from wage controls.
Prior to this, those earning $2.75 or less per hour were exempted, and early in the program
only those earning $1.90 per hour or less were exempted from controls. See note 19 supra;,
HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 345-47.
179. Mitchell, supra note 174, at 500.
180. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 719.
181. Mitchell, supra note 174, at 50. A large percentage of wage complaints concerned
pay increases of public officials that were reported in the media. Id.
182. Id. Spot checks were used primarily to detect violations of rules governing execu-
tive compensation. Much of the spot-checking was directed at management-consulting
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whole, wage controls worked effectively because of their self-exe-
cuting nature. 8 3 Controls on executive compensation, however,
were less effective since corporate management was often willing
to grant relatively large pay increases to themselves and others of
their general status and position.1 84 Furthermore, while the gen-
eral percentage standard for wage increases operated relatively ef-
fectively, such a standard has certain faults: it freezes intact the
existing structure of relative rates of earned income, 185 adversely
affects collective barganing,1 6 and, if applied to low income
workers, perpetuates their status.'
8 7
B. Enforcement of Price Controls
Price control regulations were not strictly enforced, partially as
a result of the lack of a systematic enforcement policy and the
assignment of limited personnel to the enforcement effort.1
8 8
There were no guidelines as to when litigation or other adminis-
trative sanctions were to be imposed; thus, suits were brought on a
random basis.8 9 The basic objectives of the enforcement program
were to identify and take visible action against violators, thereby
firms and financial institutions since such organizations have many contacts in the business
world, and would, presumably, spread the word concerning the strictness of the enforce-
ment effort. Id.
183. See id. at 52-61.
184. In 1973, executive compensation increased by an average of 13% as compared to
only a 7% increase in total compensation. Executive Compensation: Getting Richer in -73,"
BUSINESS WEEK, May 4, 1974, at 58-59. Senator Proxmire labeled this type of disparity
"rank discrimination which applies one policy for the mass of Americans and another for
the elitist few." Proxmire Criticizes Executives'Raires, Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1973, at
12, col. 6.
185. The goal of stabilization controls is to make both wages and prices rise more
slowly, not to alter their relative rates of change or to redistribute income or wealth. Mitch-
ell, supra note 174, at 50.
186. The imposition of a ceiling on wage increases tends to disrupt collective bargain-
ing negotiations. Employees often believe that they are entitled to a certain percentage
increase and become dissatisfied with union officials who settle at a lower figure. Con-
versely, employers are tempted, in the face of a strike, to settle for a higher figure and then
argue to the stabilization agency that the increase embodied in the signed agreement
should be reduced because it violates the wage ceiling. 1974 House Hearings, supra note
85, at 13-14 (statement of John T. Dunlop, Director, Cost of Living Council).
187. See 1971 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 5, at 444 (statement of Rep. Ryan).
To avoid this problem, low income workers could be exempted from controls, as was done
in the World War II and Korean War stabilization programs, and eventually in the Nixon
administration's stabilization program. Id See also note 19 supra.
188. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1054. During Phase II, approxi-
mately 42% of the enforcement personnel was devoted to rent controls, even though rents
accounted for less than 5% of the Consumer Price Index. Id.
189. Id. at 1056-57.
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deterring noncompliance and creating a "federal presence" in the
field as a reminder to businesses that they were bound by price
controls. 90 This federal presence was established primarily
through the assignment of Internal Revenue Service agents to in-
vestigate stabilization regulation violations.' 9 ' This had an im-
plicit coercive effect because of the general reputation of that
agency.' 92  However, the fear of tax harassment against com-
plaining or uncooperative businesses led to some congressional
opposition to assigning this task to the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. 193
Complaints by the public were the primary means of identify-
ing suspected violations of price control regulations. ' 94 In addi-
tion, enforcement personnel examined economic data filed by
businesses pursuant to stabilization regulations, 95 and conducted
investigations and spot checks.' 96 After detecting violations, the
stabilization agencies issued remedial orders requiring violators to
undertake affirmative action to correct their violations. 97 Puni-
tive sanctions were sometimes assessed. For example, a treble
rollback order required a firm to reduce its prices by triple the
revenues derived from unlawful price increases. 198 Although
there was no express statutory authority for the imposition of ad-
190. Id. at 708.
191. Id. at 1052; YOSHPE & ALLUMS, supra note 70, at 118.
192. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 95.
193. See 117 CONG. REC. 46,005 (1971) (remarks of Reps. Gonzales, Gross & Long).
This was possible since Internal Revenue Service personnel sometimes combined tax and
stabilization work. 1974 House.4ppropriations Hearings, supra note 70, at 685 (statement of
Edward F. Preston, Assistant Commissioner for Stabilization, Internal Revenue Service).
194. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 98. Earl D. Rhode, Executive Secretary of the Cost of
Living Council, was quoted as saying "[t]he citizen's role in [the Phase II] program is to rat
on his neighbor if his neighbor violated the controls." Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1971, at 6, col. 1.
Sophisticated and detailed complaints were sometimes received, for example, from a firm
concerning its supplier. Such a detailed complaint could result in a careful investigation
and a full audit. 1974 House Appropriations Hearings, supra note 70, at 686 (statement of
Edward F. Preston). More general complaints were used, but primarily as intelligence
leads. Id. Of 46,000 written citizen complaints received during Phase I, only a few hundred
were found to merit some degree of investigation, and only 37 were referred to the Justice
Department for possible litigation. A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 110-11.
195. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 710-11.
196. Id. at 706, 709.
197. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 85, at 389 (statement of James B. Minor, Chair-
man, Wage-Price Stabilization Committee, American Bar Association).
198. Id. at 388; HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1136-37. The punitive
effect of a treble rollback order was questionable since some companies ordered to reduce
prices in this manner experienced increased volume and a higher total profit as a result. C.
GRAYSON & L. NEEB, supra note 49, at 202.
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ministrative sanctions, 99 and Congress apparently had not envi-
sioned such a procedure being used as a major enforcement
tool,2"' the treble rollback procedure was never successfully chal-
lenged in court.2 ' In addition to administrative sanctions, stabili-
zation agencies developed a settlement procedure to avoid court
or administrative proceedings.2"2
During the stabilization program, proposals were advanced to
require hearings before an independent administrative law judge
prior to the assessment of any penalty for price control viola-
tions.20 3 After hearing evidence in each individual case, an ad-
ministrative law judge could recommend a civil penalty which the
agency might assess at its discretion. Both the stabilization agency
and the alleged violator would be entitled to judicial review of the
initial administrative decision without the necessity of a de novo
proceeding. 2' The drawbacks of this proposal, however, out-
weigh its benefits. During the stabilization program, some compa-
nies charged with price control violations preferred the informal
agency administrative procedures to court proceedings, despite the
lack of procedural safeguards, since litigation engendered more
negative publicity.0 5 In addition, it would have been unduly
cumbersome to set up a mini-judicial system, complete with ad-
ministrative law judges, in a stabilization agency in which an im-
mediate enforcement impact was necessary. Adequate due
process safeguards were provided by an administrative determina-
tion of an appropriate penalty that was subject to compromise,
eventual litigation, and de novo review.
Although the stabilization agencies were officially represented
199. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1053. The Price Commission
adopted the treble rollback procedure reasoning that it had an inherent power to issue any
orders necessary and proper to accomplish its statutory responsibilities, except orders im-
posing criminal penalties. Id. at 1137.
200. See S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 9, refprintedin [1971] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2291 (indicating that injunctions would be the government's primary enforce-
ment tool and that the government would not bring treble damage actions). But see H.R.
REP. No. 714, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (indicating that the treble damage provision was in-
tended to serve as a deterrent as well as a means of recovering losses).
201. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1137.
202. Although there was no specific statutory authority for this, the Price Commission
felt that it had inherent authority to settle for less than the maximum fine to avoid litiga-
tion. Id.
203. See 1974House Hearings, supra note 85, at 389-91 (statement of James B. Minor);
1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 51, at 292 (statement of James B. Minor).
204. See 1974House Hearings, supra note 85, at 389-91 (statement of James B. Minor);
1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 51, at 292 (statement of James B. Minor).
205. HISTORICAl. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1057.
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in litigation by the Justice Department, 20 6 the government was re-
luctant to go to court to enforce stabilization regulations. 207 Rea-
sons for this reluctance included the courts' inability to enforce the
regulations due to their ambiguity and complexity, the time-con-
suming nature of litigation when an immediate enforcement im-
pact was needed, and the inadequacy of enforcement
investigation.20 8 As a result, the threat of legal proceedings was
the preferred technique, rather than their actual initiation;20 9 for-
mal legal action was instituted in very few cases.210 With few ex-
ceptions litigation was pursued on a random basis,211 with no real
attempt to focus on particularly inflationary sectors of the econ-
omy or on market leaders.21 2
C. Use of Publicity as an Enforcement Tool
Stabilization agencies allegedly used adverse publicity as an
enforcement tool.2 1  This was considered unfair and improper on
the ground that it was unauthorized and beyond the effective pro-
206. The Department of Justice, through the Economic Stabilization Section of the
Civil Division, handled enforcement litigation, defended suits brought against stabilization
agencies, and on occasion intervened in private litigation. 1974 House Appropriations Hear-
ings, supra note 70, at 674 (statement of James W. McClane, Deputy Director, Cost of
Living Council).
207. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1052-56; A. WEBER, supra note
68, at 95-96. Even when a stabilization agency concluded that a lawsuit should be filed
against an alleged violator, the Justice Department sometimes refused to bring suit. His-
TORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1052.
208. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1052-56.
209. Id. at 1056; A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 95.
210. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1052-56; A. WEBER, supra note
68, at 96.
211. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1056-57. Based largely on public
relations considerations, exceptions were made during Phase II to pursue litigation to the
fullest to obtain compliance with rent and retail price-posting regulations. Id.
212. Id. at 1057. There was an attempt to focus litigation on three industries-meat-
packing, supermarkets, and lumber-in which there existed widespread noncompliance
with stabilization regulations. The efforts were doomed to fail, however, because of imper-
fections in the applicable regulations. Id.
213. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 48-50 (statement of Prof
Ernest Gellhorn); Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1380, 1403-06 (1973). Gellhorn cites an instance in which the Cost of Living Council, by
public press conference, announced that the dividend policies of six firms were inconsistent
with the wage-price control program. The Treasury Secretary and two Cost of Living
Council aides met with the chief executive of each company and strongly discouraged divi-
dend increases. One company, Florida Telephone Corporation, refused to limit dividends.
Administration officials contacted financial institutions and large customers of the com-
pany and, apparently, persuaded them to exert pressure on the company's management.
The chairman of Florida Telephone finally agreed to offset the dividend increase in the
next quarter. Id. For another account of this incident, see A. WEBER, supra note 68, at 94.
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tection of the courts.2 14 Partially in response to this sentiment,
both legislative21 5 and administrative2 1 6 proposals were advanced
to restrict the use of prejudicial publicity by government agencies.
However, the adoption of a strict rule restricting the use of public-
ity would be ill advised for several reasons. Public criticism of
wage and price increases, or jawboning, has long been used as an
integral part of government income policies.2" 7 In addition, re-
stricting the dissemination of accurate information would be a re-
treat from the policy of favoring the public sector's right to
know. 21 8 Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to prevent an
agency or public official from publicizing suspected violations of
the law.219
D. Private Enforcement of Controls
In response to testimony that the Executive should not be al-
lowed to concentrate enforcement powers in itself,220 Congress
provided that private actions could be brought for violations of
214. See 1973 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 8, at 48-50 (statement of Prof.
Ernest Gellhorn); Gellhorn, supra note 213, at 1403-06.
215. H.R. 10197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1975), reprinted in Administrative Procedure:
Hearings on H.A 10194, HR 10195, HR 10196, HR 10197, H.R 10198, and HR 10199
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House
Judiciary Hearings]. The bill prohibited agencies and their employees from making public
information about an investigation if the contents would harm a party, unless the benefit to
the public clearly outweighed the potential harm to the party. It also required agencies to
give advance notice to a party potentially affected by proposed publicity to allow the party
to seek judicial review or prepare an answer for release to the press. Id. at 18-20; see 1975
House Judiciary Hearings, supra at 35-36 (statement of William Warfield Ross, Chairman,
Committee on Revision of the Administrative Procedure Act, Section of Administrative
Law, American Bar Association).
216. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 73-1, reprinted
in I C.F.R. § 305.73-1 (1977).
217. See EXHORTATION AND CONTROLS: THE SEARCH FOR A WAGE-PRICE POLICY
1945-1971, at 75-76, 205, 286 (C. Goodwin ed. 1975).
218. 1975 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 243, at 66-67 (statement of Judge Wil-
liam Fauver, President, The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference). This policy
has been recognized in such legislation as the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551, 552, 552b, 554, 556, 557 (1976), and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976).
219. Eg., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C.
Cir. 1968). In that case the court upheld the right of the Federal Trade Commission to
issue a factual news release concerning a complaint issued in a pending adjudicatory pro-
ceeding. In a concurring opinion, Judge Robinson stated that "[plublicity, or the specter of
publicity, may also, in a very practical way, achieve on its own a degree of informal regula-
tion by deterring those who otherwise might be tempted to take liberties with the law." Id.
at 1318.
220. Eg., 1971 Extension Hearings, supra note 8, at 504 (statement of Ralph Nader).
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stabilization regulations.22 1 However, because no provision was
made for class action suits, 222 and because the public had little
access to corporate data bearing on possible price violations, 23
relatively few private actions were brought under the Stabilization
Act.2 24
E. A Suggested Program for Enforcement
Should new price control regulations be imposed, a mix of en-
forcement tools should be provided to allow the government flex-
ibility and discretion. These could include a treble damage
provision for willful or knowing violations of price regulations,
along with provisions for lesser civil fines and injunctive relief.
Private enforcement actions could be encouraged by allowing
class action suits for violations of price control regulations, with
treble damages for intentional or knowing violations.
In cases in which it would be difficult to identify and compen-
sate every party that suffered injury because of unlawfully high
prices, the government could order the violator to reduce prices in
the future until an amount equal to the damages resulting from its
violation has been restored to the market.225 To guard against the
imposition of excessive penalties which could result from a combi-
nation of successful government and private class actions, provi-
sion could be made for the government to assume a private cause
of action. 226 The government then would be authorized, if appro-
priate, to reach a settlement with the violator subject to the ap-
proval of the court in which the original class action was filed.2 27
Agency assessment of penalties with the possibility of a de novo
review in court would afford sufficient protection for violators
while providing the immediate enforcement impact needed in a
stabilization program.
221. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
222. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 210, 85
Stat. 743 (expired 1973). See also Executive Compensation Hearings, supra note 48, at 182
(statement of Ralph Nader).
223. See notes 228-34 infra and accompanying text.
224. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1051.
225. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 3 (In enforcing violations of crude oil
price regulations, the Department of Energy has required refunds to identifiable customers
and sometimes ordered price reductions to compensate for overcharges to the general pub-
lic.).
226. The assumption of a private cause of action by the government is provided for in
the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976).
227. A federal class action cannot normally be compromised without the approval of
the court. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
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VI. PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Public access to certain corporate data would appear to be nec-
essary to make a private enforcement system effective and to allow
public investigation of the fairness of a stabilization program to
consumers and wage earners.228 After defeating proposals to
make public much of the information submitted to stabilization
agencies in justification of wage and price increases, 229 Congress
enacted provisions designed to make some of this information
publicly available." 0 However, Cost of Living Council regula-
tions implementing this provision greatly restricted the categories
of information available to the public. These regulations were
held by a court to be illegal as a frustration of congressional in-
tent, and the Council was ordered to promulgate new regula-
tions.23' When issued, the new regulations were challenged in
228. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 43,480 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); 117 CONG.
REC. 43,244 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). Some have suggested that the public
should be granted a right to certain corporate information as it has been granted a right to
certain government information. Role of Giant Corporations: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, Part 2, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1048 (1971) (statement of Ralph Nader) [hereinafter cited as Giant Corporation
Hearings].
229. See 117 CONG. REc. 46,015 (1971) (amendment of Rep. Badillo); 117 CoNM. REC.
43,480 (1971) (amendment of Sen. Nelson).
230. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, § 6, 87 Stat.
27 (expired 1974). This required the disclosure of data contained in quarterly reports filed
by companies with annual sales of $250 million or more which raised the price of a product
accounting for 5% or more of their sales by an amount greater than 1.5%. An exception
was made for proprietary data, which consisted of data relating to the trade secrets,
processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus of the business. Id. It was argued that
this exception was too broad since the term "trade secret" lacked a precise legal definition.
Giant Corporation Hearings, supra note 228, at 1048 (statement of Ralph Nader).
231. Consumers Union v. Cost of Living Council, 491 F.2d 1396 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 98 (1974). The court held certain regulations to be illegal as
contravening § 205(b)(3) of the Economic Stabilization Act which prohibited the Council
from defining as proprietary and thus excluding from disclosure, "information or data
which cannot currently be excluded from public annual reports to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission .. " Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-28, § 6, 87 Stat. 27 (expired 1974). The regulations defined proprietary data to include
information concerning annual sales or revenues, net sales, and operating income, even
though these types of information are reported to the SEC. However, since the Council's
definitions of this data differed from the definitions used by the SEC--the Council's defini-
tion of annual sales or revenues did not include revenues from foreign corporations, and its
definition of net sales excluded revenue from foreign operations, public utilities, insurance,
and farming-this data remained confidential. The Council contended that since the
"numbers" reported to it could be substantially different from those reported to the SEC,
this data need not be disclosed. The court held that by adding the public disclosure provi-
sion to the Act, Congress did not intend "information or data" to mean "numerically iden-
tical information data," and that the intended effect was to withhold from the Cost of
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court as going beyond the intent of Congress in requiring disclo-
sure. However, the issue was mooted before resolution by the ex-
piration of stabilization authority.232
In support of limiting public access to corporate information,
the contention was made that businesses would not submit accu-
rate, complete data unless assured by the government that they
would be kept confidential.233 Since agency decisions on matters
such as exceptions often turn on the submission of complete sup-
porting data, it is likely that companies would want to submit
complete data if only to secure favorable treatment. The accuracy
of the data could be enhanced further by provisions making the
submission of false data a civil or criminal offense. In addition,
agency subpoena authority could be exercised to secure data im-
properly withheld.234
Since a stabilization program depends so much on public sup-
port and voluntary compliance, nonproprietary data submitted by
businesses should be disclosed to the public so that consumers can
judge for themselves whether price increases or special exceptions
are justified. In this way, the public can discover any special treat-
ment given the more powerful or politically connected corpora-
tions and industries. Allowing the public access to data relied
upon by stabilization officials in their decisionmaking could help
check political favoritism by opening the decisionmaking process
to more searching analysis. It could also encourage private inves-
tigations and enforcement actions by permitting private citizens to
search for evidence of possible violations of regulations in the
mass of information that normally can be examined only superfi-
cially by an understaffed agency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In general, a stabilization program seeks to effectively and eq-
uitably control inflation, while avoiding the institution of massive
bureaucracy. Although these goals may seem contradictory, cer-
tain changes in program structure and procedure, if administered
Living Council any discretion to exclude from public disclosure business information re-
quired by the SEC, notwithstanding that divergence of definitions. 491 F.2d at 1403.
232. HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 1123-25.
233. Id. at 1122-23.
234. Stabilization agencies were granted subpoena power by the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 206, 85 Stat. 743 (expired 1973). The
Council on Wage and Price Stability has limited subpoena authority as a result of the
Council on Wage and Price Stability Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-78,
§ 2(g)(2), 89 Stat. 411 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 note (1978 Supp.)).
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properly, could help to realize them should mandatory controls be
reimposed. Detailed and precise stabilization regulations accom-
panied by understandable explanations could reduce the number
of exception requests. z35 Fairness and predictability in the grant-
ing of exceptions could be promoted by the development of a
known body of precedent setting forth guidelines for decisions on
exception requests, rather than permitting unrecorded ex parte
contacts.236 Companies requesting exceptions or other special
consideration should be forced to release relevant nonproprietary
financial data, thus giving consumer groups and other interested
parties an opportunity to analyze the validity of any special bene-
fit allowed. 237 Enforcement of regulations could be strengthened
by allowing private class action suits, and intentional or knowing
violations of regulations could be deterred by authorizing treble
damages for such infractions. 28 Finally, in any future program,
Congress should exercise greater responsibility and control by
mandating a general administrative structure and by providing
more comprehensive policy guidelines. 239
When considering the feasibility and advisability of imposing
mandatory economic controls, an analysis of the Nixon adminis-
tration's stabilization program provides a useful starting point.
That analysis highlights the point that an almost unlimited dele-
gation of power to the Executive, subject only to vague standards,
can allow for the operation of a program which may effectively
redistribute income from average wage and salary earners to the
wealthier segments of society. The Nixon-era stabilization effort
decreased workers' real income by controlling most salaries and
wages while allowing prices to rise and while exempting corporate
profits, dividends, and interest rates from any effective control.240
235. See text accompanying notes 62-74 supra; notes 130 & 144 supra; and text accom-
panying notes 133-36 supra.
236. See text accompanying notes 155-60 supra.
237. See text accompanying notes 222-24, 228-34 supra.
238. See text accompanying notes 225-27 supra.
239. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
240. According to Dr. Arnold R. Weber, a public member of the Pay Board during
Phase II, "[t]he idea of the freeze and Phase I was to zap labor, and we did." BUSINESS
WEEK, April 27, 1974, at 108. In the two-year period from December 1971 to December
1973, average after-tax weekly wages increased an average of 13%. See Current Labor
Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1972, at 97; id., June 1974, at 106. The after-tax
profits of the 1,000 largest industrial corporations, however, increased 66%, from $25 bil-
lion a year in 1971 to $42 billion a year in 1973. See FORTUNE DOUBLE 500 DIRECTORY
161, 231 (1974). During this period Senator Proxmire stated that "the administration has
all but crossed over the threshold marking the point at which the authority granted by the
Economic Stabilization Act is converted from a powerful tool designed to safeguard the
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Clearly, the mere incorporation of the above proposed structural
and procedural reforms in any future stabilization program would
not guarantee an equitable and effective system. However, these,
coupled with an organized and informed citizenry provided with
structures and procedures that encourage and accommodate mass
participation, will help ensure the effective and just administration
of a system of economic controls.
JoHN J. RIGBY
economic well-being of the Nation's People into a mechanism which victimizes most of the
Nation's population." The 1972 Economic Report of the President: Hearings Before the
Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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